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Abstract 
 We present a first of its kind framework which overcomes a major 
challenge in the design of digital systems that are resilient to reliability 
failures: achieve desired resilience targets at minimal costs (energy, 
power, execution time, area) by combining resilience techniques across 
various layers of the system stack (circuit, logic, architecture, software, 
algorithm). This is also referred to as cross-layer resilience. In this paper, 
we focus on radiation-induced soft errors in processor cores. We address 
both single-event upsets (SEUs) and single-event multiple upsets 
(SEMUs) in terrestrial environments. Our framework automatically and 
systematically explores the large space of comprehensive resilience 
techniques and their combinations across various layers of the system 
stack (586 cross-layer combinations in this paper), derives cost-effective 
solutions that achieve resilience targets at minimal costs, and provides 
guidelines for the design of new resilience techniques. We demonstrate 
the practicality and effectiveness of our framework using two diverse 
designs: a simple, in-order processor core and a complex, out-of-order 
processor core. Our results demonstrate that a carefully optimized 
combination of circuit-level hardening, logic-level parity checking, and 
micro-architectural recovery provides a highly cost-effective soft error 
resilience solution for general-purpose processor cores. For example, a 
50× improvement in silent data corruption rate is achieved at only 2.1% 
energy cost for an out-of-order core (6.1% for an in-order core) with no 
speed impact. However, selective circuit-level hardening alone, guided by 
a thorough analysis of the effects of soft errors on application 
benchmarks, provides a cost-effective soft error resilience solution as well 
(with ~1% additional energy cost for a 50× improvement in silent data 
corruption rate). 
 
CCS Concepts 
• General and reference → Reliability; • Hardware → Fault 
tolerance; Transient errors and upsets; • Computer systems 
organization → Reliability 
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the cross-layer resilience challenge for designing 
robust digital systems: given a set of resilience techniques at various 
abstraction layers (circuit, logic, architecture, software, algorithm), how 
does one protect a given design from radiation-induced soft errors using 
(perhaps) a combination of these techniques, across multiple 
abstraction layers, such that overall soft error resilience targets are met 
at minimal costs (energy, power, execution time, area)? Specific soft error 
resilience targets addressed in this paper are: Silent Data Corruption 
(SDC), where an error causes the system to output an incorrect result 
without error indication; and, Detected but Uncorrected Error (DUE), 
where an error is detected (e.g., by a resilience technique or a system crash 
or hang) but is not recovered automatically without user intervention. 
The need for cross-layer resilience, where multiple error resilience 
techniques from different layers of the system stack cooperate to achieve 
cost-effective error resilience, is articulated in several publications (e.g., 
[Borkar 05, Cappello 14, Carter 10, DeHon 10, Gupta 14, Henkel 14, 
Pedram 12]). 
There are numerous publications on error resilience techniques, many 
of which span multiple abstraction layers. These publications mostly 
                                                                                             
1 Other error sources (voltage noise and circuit-aging) may be incorporated into 
CLEAR, but are not the focus of this paper. 
2 An earlier version ([Cheng 16]) included combinations that were valid, but 
describe specific implementations. Examples include structural integrity 
checking [Lu 82] and its derivatives (mostly spanning architecture and 
software layers) or the combined use of circuit hardening, error detection 
(e.g., using logic parity checking and residue codes) and instruction-level 
retry [Ando 03, Meaney 05, Sinharoy 11] (spanning circuit, logic, and 
architecture layers). Cross-layer resilience implementations in 
commercial systems are often based on “designer experience” or 
“historical practice.” There exists no comprehensive framework to 
systematically address the cross-layer resilience challenge. Creating such 
a framework is difficult. It must encompass the entire design flow end-to-
end, from comprehensive and thorough analysis of various combinations 
of error resilience techniques all the way to layout-level implementations, 
such that one can (automatically) determine which resilience technique or 
combination of techniques (either at the same abstraction layer or across 
different abstraction layers) should be chosen. However, such a 
framework is essential in order to answer important cross-layer resilience 
questions such as: 
1. Is cross-layer resilience the best approach for achieving a given 
resilience target at low cost? 
2. Are all cross-layer solutions equally cost-effective? If not, which 
cross-layer solutions are the best? 
3. How do cross-layer choices change depending on application-level 
energy, latency, and area constraints? 
4. How can one create a cross-layer resilience solution that is cost-
effective across a wide variety of application workloads? 
5. Are there general guidelines for new error resilience techniques to 
be cost-effective?  
We present CLEAR (Cross-Layer Exploration for Architecting 
Resilience), a first of its kind framework, which addresses the cross-layer 
resilience challenge. In this paper, we focus on the use of CLEAR for 
radiation-induced soft errors1 in terrestrial environments. 
Although the soft error rate of an SRAM cell or a flip-flop stays roughly 
constant or even decreases over technology generations, the system-level 
soft error rate increases with increased integration [Mitra 14, Seifert 10, 
12]. Moreover, soft error rates can increase when lower supply voltages 
are used to improve energy efficiency [Mahatme 13, Pawlowski 14]. We 
focus on flip-flop soft errors because design techniques to protect them 
are generally expensive. Coding techniques are routinely used for 
protecting on-chip memories. Combinational logic circuits are 
significantly less susceptible to soft errors and do not pose a concern [Gill 
09, Seifert 12]. We address both single-event upsets (SEUs) and single-
event multiple upsets (SEMUs) [Lee 10, Pawlowski 14]. While CLEAR 
can address soft errors in various digital components of a complex 
System-on-a-Chip (including uncore components [Cho 15] and hardware 
accelerators), a detailed analysis of soft errors in all these components is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Hence, we focus on soft errors in 
processor cores. 
 To demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of CLEAR, we 
explore 586 cross-layer combinations using ten representative error 
detection/correction techniques and four hardware error recovery 
techniques2. These techniques span various layers of the system stack: 
circuit, logic, architecture, software, and algorithm (Fig. 1). Our extensive 
cross-layer exploration encompasses over 9 million flip-flop soft error 
injections into two diverse processor core architectures (Table 1): a simple 
in-order SPARC Leon3 core (InO-core) and a complex super-scalar out-
of-order Alpha IVM core (OoO-core), across 18 benchmarks: 
SPECINT2000 [Henning 00] and DARPA PERFECT [DARPA]. Such 
covered by cheaper combinations (e.g., LEAP-DICE + flush recovery vs. LEAP-
DICE only). These extra combinations were removed as they do not change any 
conclusions. 
  
 
extensive exploration enables us to conclusively answer the above cross-
layer resilience questions: 
1. For a wide range of error resilience targets, optimized cross-layer 
combinations can provide low cost solutions for soft errors. 
2. Not all cross-layer solutions are cost-effective. 
a. For general-purpose processor cores, a carefully optimized 
combination of selective circuit-level hardening, logic-level parity 
checking, and micro-architectural recovery provides a highly effective 
cross-layer resilience solution. For example, a 50× SDC improvement 
(defined in Sec. 2.1) is achieved at 2.1% and 6.1% energy costs for the 
OoO- and InO-cores, respectively. The use of selective circuit-level 
hardening and logic-level parity checking is guided by a thorough 
analysis of the effects of soft errors on application benchmarks.  
b. When the application space can be restricted to matrix operations, 
a cross-layer combination of Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) 
correction, selective circuit-level hardening, logic-level parity checking, 
and micro-architectural recovery can be highly effective. For example, a 
50× SDC improvement is achieved at 1.9% and 3.1% energy costs for the 
OoO- and InO-cores, respectively. But, this approach may not be practical 
for general-purpose processor cores targeting general applications. 
c. Selective circuit-level hardening, guided by a thorough analysis of 
the effects of soft errors on application benchmarks, provides a highly 
effective soft error resilience approach. For example, a 50× SDC 
improvement is achieved at 3.1% and 7.3% energy costs for the OoO- and 
InO-cores, respectively. 
3. The above conclusions about cost-effective soft error resilience 
techniques largely hold across various application characteristics (e.g., latency 
constraints despite errors in soft real-time applications). 
4. Selective circuit-level hardening (and logic-level parity checking) 
techniques are guided by the analysis of the effects of soft errors on 
application benchmarks. Hence, one must address the challenge of 
potential mismatch between application benchmarks vs. applications in 
the field, especially when targeting high degrees of resilience (e.g., 10× 
or more SDC improvement). We overcome this challenge using various 
flavors of circuit-level hardening techniques (details in Sec. 4). 
5. Cost-effective resilience approaches discussed above provide 
bounds that new soft error resilience techniques must achieve to be 
competitive. It is, however, crucial that the benefits and costs of new 
techniques are evaluated thoroughly and correctly before publication.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
3 11 SPEC / 7 PERFECT benchmarks for InO-cores and 8 SPEC / 3 PERFECT for 
OoO-cores (missing benchmarks contain floating-point instructions not 
executable by the OoO-core RTL model). 
2. CLEAR Framework 
 Figure 1 gives an overview of the CLEAR framework. Individual 
components of the framework are discussed below.  
 
2.1 Reliability Analysis 
CLEAR is not merely an error rate projection tool; rather, reliability 
analysis is a component of the overall CLEAR framework. 
 We use flip-flop soft error injections for reliability analysis with respect 
to radiation-induced soft errors. This is because radiation test results 
confirm that injection of single bit-flips into flip-flops closely models soft 
error behaviors in actual systems [Bottoni 14, Sanda 08]. Furthermore, 
flip-flop-level error injection is crucial since naïve high-level error 
injections can be highly inaccurate [Cho 13]. For individual flip-flops, 
both SEUs and SEMUs manifest as single-bit errors. Our SEMU-tolerant 
circuit hardening and our layout implementations ensure this assumption 
holds for both the baseline and resilient designs. 
 We injected over 9 million flip-flop soft errors into the RTL of the 
processor designs using three BEE3 FPGA emulation systems and also 
using mixed-mode simulations on the Stampede supercomputer (TACC 
at The University of Texas at Austin) (similar to [Cho 13, Davis 09, 
Ramachandran 08, Wang 04]). This ensures that error injection results 
have less than a 0.1% margin of error with a 95% confidence interval per 
benchmark. Errors are injected uniformly into all flip-flops and 
application regions, to mimic real world scenarios. 
 The SPECINT2000 [Henning 00] and DARPA PERFECT [DARPA] 
benchmark suites are used for evaluation3. The PERFECT suite 
complements SPEC by adding applications targeting signal and image 
processing domains. We chose the SPEC workloads since the original 
publications corresponding to the resilience techniques used them for 
evaluation. We ran benchmarks in their entirety. 
Flip-flop soft errors can result in the following outcomes [Cho 13, 
Michalak 12, Sanda 08, Wang 04, 07]: Vanished - normal termination 
and output files match error-free runs, Output Mismatch (OMM) - 
normal termination, but output files are different from error-free runs, 
Unexpected Termination (UT) - program terminates abnormally, Hang 
- no termination or output within 2× the nominal execution time, Error 
Detection (ED) - an employed resilience technique flags an error, but the 
error is not recovered using a hardware recovery mechanism. 
 Using the above outcomes, any error that results in OMM causes SDC 
(i.e., an SDC-causing error). Any error that results in UT, Hang, or ED 
causes DUE (i.e., a DUE-causing error). Note that, there are no ED 
outcomes if no error detection technique is employed. The resilience of a 
protected (new) design compared to an unprotected (original, baseline) 
design can be defined in terms of SDC improvement (Eq. 1a) or DUE 
improvement (Eq. 1b). The susceptibility of flip-flops to soft errors is 
assumed to be uniform across all flip-flops in the design (but this 
parameter is adjustable in our framework). 
 Resilience techniques that increase the execution time of an application 
or add additional hardware also increase the susceptibility of the design 
Table 1. Processor designs studied. 
Core Design Description 
Clk. 
freq. 
Error 
injections 
Instructions 
Per Cycle 
InO 
Leon3 
[Leon] 
Simple, in-order 
(1,250 flip-flops) 
2.0 
GHz 
5.9 million 0.4 
OoO 
IVM 
[Wang 04] 
Complex, super-scalar, out-
of-order (13,819 flip-flops) 
600 
MHz 
3.5 million 1.3 
 
 
Figure 1. CLEAR Framework: (a) BEE3 emulation cluster / Stampede supercomputer injects over 9 million errors into two diverse processor 
architectures running 18 full-length application benchmarks. (b) Accurate physical design evaluation accounts for resilience overheads. (c) 
Comprehensive resilience library consisting of ten error detection / correction techniques + four hardware error recovery techniques. (d) Example 
illustrating thorough exploration of 586 cross-layer combinations with varying energy costs vs. percentage of SDC-causing errors protected. 
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to soft-errors. To accurately account for this situation, we calculate, based 
on [Schirmeier 15], a correction factor γ (where γ ≥ 1), which is applied 
to ensure a fair and accurate comparison for all techniques4. Take for 
instance the monitor core technique; in our implementation, it increases 
the number of flip-flops in a resilient OoO-core by 38%. These extra flip-
flops become additional locations for soft errors to occur. This results in 
a γ correction of 1.38 in order to account for the increased susceptibility 
of the design to soft errors. Techniques which increase execution time 
have a similar impact. For example, CFCSS incurs a 40.6% execution 
time impact; a corresponding γ correction of 1.41. A technique such as 
DFC, which increases flip-flop count (20%) and execution time (6.2%), 
would need a γ correction of 1.28 (1.2×1.062) since the impact is 
multiplicative (increased flip-flop count over an increased duration). The 
γ correction factor allows us to account for these increased susceptibilities 
for fair and accurate comparisons of all resilience techniques considered 
[Schirmeier 15]. SDC and DUE improvements with γ=1 can be back-
calculated by multiplying the reported γ value in Table 3 and do not 
change our conclusions. 
 
𝑆𝐷𝐶 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
(𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑀𝑀 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)
(𝑛𝑒𝑤 𝑂𝑀𝑀 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) 
 ×  𝛾−1         (Eq. 1a) 
 
𝐷𝑈𝐸 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  
(𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 (𝑈𝑇+𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑔) 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)
(𝑛𝑒𝑤 (𝑈𝑇+𝐻𝑎𝑛𝑔+𝐸𝐷) 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡)
× 𝛾−1     (Eq. 1b) 
 
Reporting SDC and DUE improvements allows our results to be 
agnostic to absolute error rates. Although we have described the use of 
error injection-driven reliability analysis, the modular nature of CLEAR 
allows us to swap in other approaches as appropriate (e.g., our error 
injection analysis could be substituted with techniques like [Mirkhani 
15b], once they are properly validated). 
As shown in Table 2, across our set of applications, not all flip-flops 
will have errors that result in SDC or DUE (errors in 19% of flip-flops in 
the InO-core and 39% of flip-flops in the OoO-core always vanish 
regardless of the application). The logic design structures (e.g., lowest 
hierarchical-level RTL component) these flip-flops belong to are listed in 
Appendix A. This phenomenon has been documented in the literature 
[Sullivan 16] and is due to the fact that errors that impact certain structures 
(e.g., branch predictor, trap status registers, etc.) have no effect on 
program execution or correctness. Additionally, this means that resilience 
techniques would not normally need to be applied to these flip-flops. 
However, for completeness, we also report design points which would 
achieve the maximum improvement possible, where resilience is added to 
every single flip-flop (including those with errors that always vanish). 
This maximum improvement point provides an upper bound for cost 
(given the possibility that for a future application, a flip-flop that currently 
has errors that always vanish may encounter an SDC- or DUE-causing 
error). 
 
 
 
Error Detection Latency (the time elapsed from when an error occurs 
in the processor to when a resilience technique detects the error) is also 
an important aspect to consider. An end-to-end reliable system must not 
only detect errors, but also recover from these detected errors. Long 
detection latencies impact the amount of computation that needs to be 
recovered and can also limit the types of recovery that are capable of 
recovering the detected error (Sec. 2.4).  
 
2.2 Execution Time 
 Execution time is estimated using FPGA emulation and RTL 
simulation. Applications are run to completion to accurately capture the 
execution time of an unprotected design. We also report the error-free 
execution time impact associated with resilience techniques at the 
                                                                                             
4 Research literature commonly considers γ=1. We report results using true γ 
architecture, software, and algorithm levels. For resilience techniques at 
the circuit and logic levels, our design methodology maintains the same 
clock speed as the unprotected design. 
 
2.3 Physical Design 
 We used Synopsys design tools (Design Compiler, IC compiler, and 
Primetime) [Synopsys] with a commercial 28nm technology library (with 
corresponding SRAM compiler) to perform synthesis, place-and-route, 
and power analysis. Synthesis and place-and-route (SP&R) was run for 
all configurations of the design (before and after adding resilience 
techniques) to ensure all constraints of the original design (e.g., timing 
and physical design) were met for the resilient designs. Design tools often 
introduce artifacts (e.g., slight variations in the final design over multiple 
SP&R runs) that impact the final design characteristics (e.g., area, power). 
These artifacts can be caused by small variations in the RTL or 
optimization heuristics, for example. To account for these artifacts, we 
generated separate resilient designs based on error injection results for 
each individual application benchmark. SP&R was then performed for 
each of these designs, and the reported design characteristics were 
averaged to minimize the artifacts. For example, for each of our 18 
application benchmarks, a separate resilient design that achieves a 50× 
SDC improvement using LEAP-DICE only is created. The costs to 
achieve this improvement are reported by averaging across the 18 designs. 
Relative standard deviation (i.e., standard deviation / mean) across all 
experiments range from 0.6-3.1%.  Finally, we note that all layouts 
created during physically design are carefully generated in order to 
mitigate the impact of SEMUs (as explained in Sec. 2.4). 
 
2.4 Resilience Library 
 We carefully chose ten error detection and correction techniques 
together with four hardware error recovery techniques. These techniques 
largely cover the space of existing soft error resilience techniques. The 
characteristics (e.g., costs, resilience improvement, etc.) of each resilience 
technique when used as a standalone solution (e.g., an error detection / 
correction technique by itself or, optionally, in conjunction with a 
recovery technique) are presented in Table 3. 
 Circuit: The hardened flip-flops (LEAP-DICE, Light Hardened LEAP, 
LEAP-ctrl) in Table 4 are designed to tolerate both SEUs and SEMUs at 
both nominal and near-threshold operating voltages [Lee 10, Lilja 13]. 
SEMUs especially impact circuit techniques since a single strike affects 
multiple nodes within a flip-flop. Thus, these specially designed hardened 
flip-flops, which tolerate SEMUs through charge cancellation, are 
required. Hardened flip-flops have been experimentally validated using 
radiation experiments on test chips fabricated in 90nm, 45nm, 40nm, 
32nm, 28nm, 20nm, and 14nm nodes in both bulk and SOI technologies 
and can be incorporated into standard cell libraries (i.e., standard cell 
design guidelines are satisfied) [Lee 10, Lilja 13, Lilja 16, Quinn 15a, 
Quinn 15b, Turowski 15]. The LEAP-ctrl flip-flop is a special design, 
which can operate in resilient (high resilience, high power) and economy 
(low resilience, low power) modes. It is useful in situations where a 
software or algorithm technique only provides protection when running 
specific applications and thus, selectively enabling low-level hardware 
resilience when the former techniques are unavailable may be beneficial. 
While Error Detection Sequential (EDS) [Bowman 09, 11] was originally 
designed to detect timing errors, it can be used to detect flip-flop soft 
errors as well. While EDS incurs less overhead at the individual flip-flop 
level vs. LEAP-DICE, for example, EDS requires delay buffers to ensure 
minimum hold constraints, aggregation and routing of error detection 
signals to an output (or recovery module), and a recovery mechanism to 
correct detected errors. These factors can significantly increase the overall 
costs for implementing a resilient design utilizing EDS (Table 17). 
 
 
 
 
 
values, but our conclusions hold for γ=1 as well (latter is optimistic). 
Table 2. Distribution of flip-flops with errors resulting in SDC and/or DUE 
over all benchmarks studied (specific flip-flop structures in Appendix A). 
Core 
% FFs with SDC-
causing errors 
% FFs with DUE-
causing errors 
% FFs with both SDC- 
and DUE-causing errors 
InO 60.1% 78.3% 81.2% 
OoO 35.7% 52.1% 61% 
 
  
 
 
 
 Logic: Parity checking provides error detection by checking flip-flop 
inputs and outputs [Spainhower 99]. Our design heuristics reduce the cost 
of parity while also ensuring that clock frequency is maintained as in the 
original design (by varying the number of flip-flops checked together, 
grouping flip-flops by timing slack, pipelining parity checker logic, etc.) 
Naïve implementations of parity checking can otherwise degrade design 
frequency by up to 200 MHz (20%) or increase energy cost by 80% on 
the InO-core. We minimize SEMUs through layouts that ensure a 
minimum spacing (the size of one flip-flop) between flip-flops checked 
by the same parity checker. This ensures that only one flip-flop, in a group 
of flip-flops checked by the same parity checker, will encounter an upset 
due to a single strike in our 28nm technology in terrestrial environments 
[Amusan 09]. Although a single strike could impact multiple flip-flops, 
since these flip-flops are checked by different checkers, the upsets will be 
detected. Since this absolute minimum spacing will remain constant, the 
relative spacing required between flip-flops will increase at smaller 
technology nodes, which may exacerbate the difficulty of 
implementation. Minimum spacing is enforced by applying design 
constraints during the layout stage. This constraint is important because 
even in large designs, flip-flops will still tend to be placed very close to 
one another. Table 5 shows the distribution of distances that each flip-flop 
                                                                                             
5 Circuit and logic techniques have tunable costs/resilience (e.g., for InO-cores, 5× 
SDC improvement using LEAP-DICE is achieved at 4.3% energy cost while 50× 
SDC improvement is achieved at 7.3% energy cost). This is achievable through 
selective insertion guided by error injection using application benchmarks. 
6 Maximum improvement reported is achieved by protecting every single flip-flop 
in the design. 
7 Software techniques are generated for InO-cores only since the LLVM compiler 
no longer supports the Alpha architecture. 
8 Some software assertions for general-purpose processors (e.g., [Sahoo 08]) suffer 
from false positives (i.e., an error is reported during an error-free run). The 
execution time impact reported discounts the impact of false positives. 
9 Improvements differ from previous publications that injected errors into 
has to its next nearest neighbor in a baseline design (this does not 
correspond to the spacing between flip-flops checked by the same logic 
parity checker). As shown, the majority of flip-flops are actually placed 
such that they would be susceptible to a SEMU. After applying parity 
checking, we see that no flip-flop, within a group checked by the same 
parity checker, is placed such that it will be vulnerable to a SEMU (Table 
6). 
 
 
 
 
 
architectural registers. [Cho 13] demonstrated such injections can be highly 
inaccurate; we used highly accurate flip-flop-level error injections. 
10 Actual detection latency for software and algorithm techniques may be shorter 
in practice. On our emulation platforms, measured detection latencies includes 
the time to trap and cleanly exit execution (on the order of a few thousand 
cycles). 
11 We report results for EDDI with store-readback [Lin 14]. Without this 
enhancement, EDDI provides 3.3× SDC / 0.4× DUE improvement. 
12 Execution time impact for ABFT detection can be high since error detection 
checks may require computationally-expensive calculations. 
13 For EDS, the costs are listed for the flip-flop only. Error signal routing and delay 
buffers (included in Table 3) increase overall cost [Bowman 11]. 
Table 4. Resilient flip-flops. 
Type Soft Error Rate Area Power Delay Energy 
Baseline 1 1 1 1 1 
Light Hardened LEAP (LHL) 2.5×10-1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.3 
LEAP-DICE 2.0×10-4 2.0 1.8 1 1.8 
LEAP-ctrl (economy mode) 1 3.1 1.2 1 1.2 
LEAP-ctrl (resilient mode) 2.0×10-4 3.1 2.2 1 2.2 
EDS13 ~100% detect 1.5 1.4 1 1.4 
 Table 5. Distribution of spacing between a flip-flop and its nearest 
neighbor in a baseline (original, unprotected) design. 
Distance InO-core OoO-core 
< 1 flip-flop length away (i.e., flip-flops are 
adjacent and vulnerable to a SEMU) 
65.2% 42.2% 
1 - 2 flip-flop lengths away 30% 30.6% 
2 - 3 flip-flop lengths away 3.7% 18.4% 
3 - 4 flip-flop lengths away 0.6% 3.5% 
> 4 flip-flop lengths away 0.5% 5.3% 
 
Table 6. Distribution of spacing between a flip-flop and its nearest 
neighbor in the same parity group (i.e., minimum distance between flip-
flops checked by the same parity checker). 
Distance InO-core OoO-core 
< 1 flip-flop length away (i.e., flip-flops are 
adjacent and vulnerable to a SEMU) 
0% 0% 
1 - 2 flip-flop lengths away 7.8% 8.8% 
2 - 3 flip-flop lengths away 5.3% 10.6% 
3 - 4 flip-flop lengths away 3.4% 18.3% 
> 4 flip-flop lengths away 83.3% 62.2% 
Average distance 4.4 flip-flops 12.8 flip-flops 
 
Table 3. Individual resilience techniques: costs and improvements when implemented as a standalone solution. 
Layer Technique 
Area 
cost 
Power 
cost 
Energy 
cost 
Exec. time 
impact 
Avg. SDC 
improve 
Avg. DUE 
improve 
False 
positive 
Detection 
latency 
γ 
Circuit5 
LEAP-DICE 
(no additional recovery needed) 
InO 0-9.3% 0-22.4% 0-22.4% 
0% 
1× - 
5,000×6 
1× - 
5,000×6 
0% n/a 0 
OoO 0-6.5% 0-9.4% 0-9.4% 
EDS 
(without recovery - unconstrained) 
InO 0-10.7% 0-22.9% 0-22.9% 
0% 
1× - 
100,000×6 
0.1×6 - 1× 0% 1 cycle 0 
OoO 0-12.2% 0-11.5% 0-11.5% 
EDS 
(with IR recovery) 
InO 0-16.7% 0-43.9% 0-43.9% 
0% 
1× -  
100,000×6 
1× - 
100,000×6 
0% 1 cycle 
1.4 
1.06 OoO 0-12.3% 0-11.6% 0-11.6% 
Logic5 
Parity 
(without recovery - unconstrained) 
InO 0-10.9% 0-23.1% 0-23.1% 
0% 
1× - 
100,000×6 
0.1×6 - 1× 0% 1 cycle 0 
OoO 0-14.1% 0-13.6% 0-13.6% 
Parity 
(with IR recovery) 
InO 0-26.9% 0-44% 0-44% 
0% 
1× - 
100,000×6 
1× - 
100,000×6 
0% 1 cycle 
1.4 
1.06 OoO 0-14.2% 0-13.7% 0-13.7% 
Arch. 
DFC 
(without recovery - unconstrained) 
InO 3% 1% 7.3% 6.2% 
1.2× 0.5× 0% 15 cycles 
1.28 
OoO 0.2% 0.1% 7.2% 7.1% 1.09 
DFC 
(with EIR recovery) 
InO 37% 33% 41.2% 6.2% 
1.2× 1.4× 0% 15 cycles 
1.48 
OoO 0.4% 0.2% 7.3% 7.1% 1.14 
Monitor core (with RoB recovery) OoO 9% 16.3% 16.3% 0% 19× 15× 0% 128 cycles 1.38 
Soft-
ware7 
Software assertions for general-purpose 
processors (without recovery - unconstrained) 
InO 0% 0% 15.6% 15.6%8 1.5×9 0.6× 0.003% 
9.3M 
cycles10 
1.16 
CFCSS (without recovery - unconstrained) InO 0% 0% 40.6% 40.6% 1.5× 0.5× 0% 
6.2M 
cycles10 
1.41 
EDDI (without recovery - unconstrained) InO 0% 0% 110% 110% 37.8×11 0.3× 0% 
287K 
cycles10 
2.1 
Alg. 
ABFT correction 
(no additional recovery needed) 
InO 
OoO 
0% 0% 1.4% 1.4% 4.3× 1.2× 0% n/a 1.01 
ABFT detection 
(without recovery - unconstrained) 
InO 
OoO 
0% 0% 24% 1-56.9%12 3.5× 0.5× 0% 
9.6M 
cycles10 
1.24 
 
  
 
 Logic parity is implemented using an XOR-tree based predictor and 
checker, which detects flip-flops soft errors. This implementation differs 
from logic parity prediction, which also targets errors inside 
combinational logic [Mitra 00]. XOR-tree logic parity is sufficient for 
detecting flip-flop soft errors (with the minimum spacing constraint 
applied). “Pipelining” in the predictor tree (Fig. 2) may be required to 
ensure 0% clock period impact. We evaluated the following heuristics for 
forming parity groups (the specific flip-flops that are checked together) 
to minimize cost of parity (cost comparisons in Table 7): 
1. Parity group size: flip-flops are clustered into a constant power of 2-
sized group, which amortizes the parity logic cost by allowing the use of 
full binary trees at the predictor and checker. The last set of flip-flops will 
consist of modulo “group size” of flip-flops. 
2. Vulnerability: flip-flops are sorted by decreasing susceptibility to 
errors causing SDC or DUE and grouped into a constant power of 2-sized 
group. The last set of flip-flops will consist of modulo “group size” of 
flip-flops. 
3. Locality: flip-flops are grouped by their location in the layout, in 
which flip-flops in the same functional unit are grouped together to help 
reduce wire routing for the predictor and checker logic. A constant power 
of 2-sized groups are formed with the last group consisting of modulo 
“group size” of flip-flops. 
4. Timing: flip-flops are sorted based on their available timing path 
slack and grouped into a constant power of 2-sized group. The last set of 
flip-flops will consist of modulo “group size” of flip-flops. 
5. Optimized: Fig. 3 describes our heuristic. Our solution is the most 
optimized and is the configuration we use to report overhead values. 
When unpipelined parity can be used, it is better to use larger-sized 
groups (e.g., 32-bit groups) in order to amortize the additional 
predictor/checker logic to the number of flip-flops protected. However, 
when pipelined parity is required, we found 16-bit groups to be a good 
option. This is because beyond 16-bits, additional pipeline flip-flops 
begin to dominate costs. These factors have driven our implementation of 
the previously described heuristics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Architecture: Our implementation of Data Flow Checking (DFC), 
which checks static dataflow graphs, includes Control Flow Checking 
(CFC), which checks static control-flow graphs. This combination 
checker resembles that of [Meixner 07], which is also similar to the 
checker in [Lu 82]. 
 Compiler optimization allows us to embed the static signatures required 
by the checkers into unused delay slots in the software, thereby reducing 
execution time overhead by 13%. 
 Table 8 helps explain why DFC is unable to provide high SDC and 
DUE improvement. Of flip-flops that have errors that result in SDCs and 
DUEs (Sec. 2.1), DFC checkers detect SDCs and DUEs in less than 68% 
of these flip-flops (these 68% of flip-flops are distributed across all 
pipeline stages). For these 68% of flip-flops, on average, DFC detects less 
than 40% of the errors that result in SDCs or DUEs. This is because not 
all errors that result in an SDC or DUE will corrupt the dataflow or control 
flow signatures checked by the technique (e.g., register contents are 
corrupted and written out to a file, but the executed instructions remain 
unchanged). The combination of these factors means DFC is only 
detecting ~30% of SDCs or DUEs; thus, the technique provides low 
resilience improvement. These results are consistent with previously 
published data (detection of ~16% of non-vanished errors) on the 
effectiveness of DFC checkers in simple cores [Meixner 07]. 
 
 
 
 Monitor cores are checker cores that validate instructions executed by 
the main core (e.g., [Austin 99, Lu 82]). We analyze monitor cores similar 
to [Austin 99]. For InO-cores, the size of the monitor core is of the same 
order as the main core, and hence, excluded from our study. For OoO-
cores, the simpler monitor core can have lower throughput compared to 
the main core and thus stall the main core. We confirm (via IPC 
estimation) that our monitor core implementation does not stall the main 
core (Table 9). 
 
 
 
 Software: Software assertions for general-purpose processors check 
program variables to detect errors. We combine assertions from [Hari 12, 
Sahoo 08] to check both data and control variables to maximize error 
coverage. Checks for data variables (e.g., end result) are added via 
compiler transformations using training inputs to determine the valid 
range of values for these variables (e.g., likely program invariants). Since 
such assertion checks are added based on training inputs, it is possible to 
encounter false positives, where an error is reported in an error-free run. 
We have determined this false positive rate by training the assertions 
using representative inputs. However, we perform final analysis by 
incorporating the input data used during evaluation into the training step 
in order to give the technique the best possible benefit and to eliminate 
the occurrence of false positives. Checks for control variables (e.g., loop 
index, stack pointer, array address) are determined using application 
profiling and are manually added in the assembly code. 
 In Table 10, we breakdown the contribution to cost, improvement, and 
false positives resulting from assertions checking data variables [Sahoo 
08] vs. those checking control variables [Hari 12].  Table 11 demonstrates 
the importance of evaluating resilience techniques using accurate 
 
Figure 2. “Pipelined” logic parity. 
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Figure 3. Logic parity heuristic for low cost parity implementation. 32-bit 
unpipelined parity and 16-bit pipelined parity were experimentally 
determined to be the lowest cost configurations. 
Set of all flip-flops in design
Implement unpipelined parity
Enough
timing slack for 32-bit
predictor tree?
yes
Finish
Group flip-flops, by 
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group is (size % 32)
(locality heuristic)
no
Implement pipelined parity
Group flip-flops, by 
functional unit into 
16-bit groups. Last 
group is (size % 16)
(locality heuristic)
Table 7. Comparison of heuristics for “pipelined” logic parity 
implementations to protect all flip-flops on the InO-core. 
Heuristic Area cost Power cost Energy cost 
Vulnerability(4-bit parity group) 15.2% 42% 42% 
Vulnerability(8-bit parity group) 13.4% 29.8% 29.8% 
Vulnerability(16-bit parity group) 13.3% 27.9% 27.9% 
Vulnerability(32-bit parity group) 14.6% 35.3% 35.3% 
Locality (16-bit parity group) 13.4% 29.4% 29.4% 
Timing (16-bit parity group) 11.5% 26.8% 26.8% 
Optimized (16-/32-bit groups) 10.9% 23.1% 23.1% 
 
Table 8. DFC error coverage. 
 
InO OoO 
SDC DUE SDC DUE 
% flip-flops with a SDC- / DUE-causing 
error that are detected by DFC 
57% 68% 65% 66% 
% of SDC- / DUE-causing errors detected 
(average per FF that is protected by DFC) 
30% 30% 29% 40% 
Overall % of SDC- / DUE-causing errors 
detected (for all flip-flops in the design) 
15.9% 27% 19.3% 30% 
Resulting improvement (Eq. 1) 1.2× 1.4× 1.2× 1.4× 
 
Table 9. Monitor core vs. main core. 
Design Clk. freq. Average Instructions Per Cycle (IPC) 
OoO-core 600 MHz 1.3 
Monitor core 2 GHz 0.7 
 
  
 
injection ([Cho 13])14. Depending on the particular error injection model 
used, SDC improvement could be over-estimated for one benchmark and 
under-estimated for another. For instance, using inaccurate architecture 
register error injection (regU), one would be led to believe that software 
assertions provide 3× the SDC improvement than they do in reality (e.g., 
when evaluated using flip-flop-level error injection). 
 In order to pinpoint the sources of inaccuracy between the actual 
improvement rates that were determined using accurate flip-flop-level 
error injection vs. those published in the literature, we conducted error 
injection campaigns at other levels of abstraction (architecture register 
and program variable). However, even then, we were unable to exactly 
reproduce previously published improvement rates. Some additional 
differences in our architecture and program variable injection 
methodology compared to the published methodology may account for 
this discrepancy:  
1. Our architecture register and program variable evaluations were 
conducted on a SPARCv8 in-order design rather than a SPARCv9 out-of-
order design. 
2. Our architecture register and program variable methodology injects 
errors uniformly into all program instructions while previous publications 
chose to only inject into integer instructions of floating-point benchmarks. 
3. Our architecture register and program variable methodology injects 
errors uniformly over the full application rather than injecting only into 
the core of the application during computation. 
4. Since our architecture register and program variable methodology 
injects errors uniformly into all possible error candidates (e.g., all cycles 
and targets), the calculated improvement covers the entire design. 
Previous publications calculated improvement over the limited subset of 
error candidates (out of all possible error candidates) that were injected 
into and thus, only covers a subset of the design. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Control Flow Checking by Software Signatures (CFCSS) checks static 
control flow graphs and is implemented via compiler modification similar 
to [Oh 02a]. We can analyze CFCSS in further detail to gain deeper 
understanding as to why improvement for the technique is relatively low 
(Table 12). Compared to DFC (a technique with a similar concept), we 
see that CFCSS offers slightly better SDC improvement. However, since 
CFCSS only checks control flow signatures, many SDCs will still escape 
(e.g., the result of an add is corrupted and written to file). Additionally, 
certain DUEs, such as those which may cause a program crash, will not 
be detectable by CFCSS, or other software techniques, since execution 
may abort before a corresponding software check can be triggered. The 
relatively low resilience improvement using CFCSS has been 
corroborated in actual systems as well [Lovellette 02]. 
 
                                                                                             
14 We studied the same SPEC applications evaluated in [Sahoo 08]. 
 
 
 Error Detection by Duplicated Instructions (EDDI) provides 
instruction redundant execution via compiler modification [Oh 2b]. We 
utilize EDDI with store-readback [Lin 14] to maximize coverage by 
ensuring that values are written correctly. From Table 13, it is clear why 
store-readback is important for EDDI. In order to achieve high SDC 
improvements, nearly all SDC causing errors need to be detected. By 
detecting an additional 12% of SDCs, store-readback increases SDC 
improvement of EDDI by an order of magnitude. Virtually all escaped 
SDCs are caught by ensuring that the values being written to the output 
are indeed correct (by reading back the written value). However, given 
that some SDC- or DUE-causing errors are still not detected by the 
technique, the results show that using naïve high-level injections will still 
yield incorrect conclusions (Table 14). Enhancements to EDDI such as 
Error detectors [Pattabiraman 09] and reliability-aware transforms 
[Rehman 14], are intended to reduce the number of EDDI checks (i.e., 
selective insertion of checks) in order to minimize execution time impact 
while maintaining high overall error coverage. We evaluated the Error 
detectors technique using flip-flop-level error injection and found that 
they provide an SDC improvement of 2.6× improvement (a 21% 
reduction in SDC improvement as compared to EDDI without store-
readback). However, Error detectors requires software path tracking to 
recalculate important variables, which introduced a 3.9× execution time 
impact, greater than that of the original EDDI technique. The overhead 
corresponding to software path tracking can be reduced by implementing 
path tracking in hardware (as was done in the original work), but doing 
so eliminates the benefits of EDDI as a software-only technique. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Algorithm: Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) can detect 
(ABFT detection) or detect and correct errors (ABFT correction) through 
algorithm modifications [Bosilca 09, Chen 05, Huang 84, Nair 90]. 
Although ABFT correction algorithms can be used for detection-only 
(with minimally reduced execution time impact), ABFT detection 
algorithms cannot be used for correction. There is often a large difference 
in execution time impact between ABFT algorithms as well depending on 
the complexity of check calculation required. An ABFT correction 
technique for matrix inner product, for example, requires simple modular 
checksums (e.g., generated by adding all elements in a matrix row) – an 
inexpensive computation. On the other hand, ABFT detection for FFT, 
for example, requires expensive calculations using Parseval’s theorem 
[Reddy 90]. For the particular applications we studied, the algorithms that 
Table 10. Comparison of assertions checking data (e.g., end result) vs. 
control (e.g., loop index) variables. 
 
Data variable 
check 
Control 
variable check 
Combined 
check 
Execution time impact 12.1% 3.5% 15.6% 
SDC improvement 1.5× 1.1× 1.5× 
DUE improvement 0.7× 0.9× 0.6× 
False positive rate 0.003% 0% 0.003% 
 
Table 11. Comparison of SDC improvement and detection for assertions 
when injecting errors at various levels. 
App.14 
Flip-flop 
(ground 
truth) 
Register 
uniform 
(regU) 
Register 
write 
(regW) 
Program 
variable uniform 
(varU) 
Program 
variable write 
(varW) 
bzip2 1.8× 1.6× 1.1× 1.9× 1.5× 
crafty 0.5× 0.3× 0.5× 0.7× 1.1× 
gzip 2× 19.3× 1× 1.6× 1.1× 
mcf 1.1× 1.3× 0.9× 1× 1.8× 
parser 2.4× 1.7× 1× 2.4× 2× 
avg. 1.6× 4.8× 0.9× 1.5× 1.5× 
 
Table 12. CFCSS error coverage. 
 SDC DUE 
% flip-flops with a SDC- / DUE-causing 
error that is detected by CFCSS 
55% 66% 
% of SDC- / DUE-causing errors that are 
detected per FF that is protected by CFCSS 
61% 14% 
Resulting improvement (Eq. 1) 1.5× 0.5× 
 
Table 13. EDDI: importance of store-readback. 
 
SDC 
improve-
ment 
% SDC 
errors 
detected 
SDC 
errors 
escaped 
DUE 
improve-
ment 
% DUE 
errors 
detected 
DUE 
errors 
escaped 
Without 
store-
readback 
3.3× 86.1% 49 0.4× 19% 3090 
With 
store-
readback 
37.8× 98.7% 6 0.3× 19.8% 3006 
 
Table 14. Comparison of SDC improvement and detection for EDDI when 
injecting errors at various levels (without store-readback). 
Injection location SDC improvement % SDC detected 
Flip-flop (ground truth) 3.3× 86.1% 
Register Uniform (RegU) 2.0× 48.8% 
Register Write (RegW) 6.6× 84.8% 
Program Variable Uniform (VarU) 12.6× 92.1% 
Program Variable Write (VarU) 100,000× 100% 
 
  
 
were protected using ABFT detection often required more 
computationally-expensive checks than algorithms that were protected 
using ABFT correction; therefore, the former generally had greater 
execution time impact (relative to each of their own original baseline 
execution times). An additional complication arises when an ABFT 
detection-only algorithm is implemented. Due to the long error detection 
latencies imposed by ABFT detection (9.6 million cycles, on average), 
hardware recovery techniques are not feasible and higher level recovery 
mechanisms will impose significant overheads. 
 Recovery: We consider two recovery scenarios: bounded latency, i.e., 
an error must be recovered within a fixed period of time after its 
occurrence, and unconstrained, i.e., where no latency constraints exist 
and errors are recovered externally once detected (no hardware recovery 
is required). Bounded latency recovery is achieved using one of the 
following hardware recovery techniques (Table 15): flush or reorder 
buffer (RoB) recovery (both of which rely on flushing non-committed 
instructions followed by re-execution) [Racunas 07, Wang 05]; 
instruction replay (IR) or extended instruction replay (EIR) recovery 
(both of which rely on instruction checkpointing to rollback and replay 
instructions) [Meaney 05]. EIR is an extension of IR with additional 
buffers required by DFC for recovery. Flush and RoB are unable to 
recover from errors detected after the memory write stage of InO-cores or 
after the reorder buffer of OoO-cores, respectively (these errors will have 
propagated to architecture visible states). Hence, LEAP-DICE is used to 
protect flip-flops in these pipeline stages when using flush/RoB recovery. 
IR and EIR can recover detected errors in any pipeline flip-flop. IR 
recovery is shown in in Fig. 4 and flush recovery is shown in Fig. 5. Since 
recovery hardware serves as single points of failure, flip-flops in the 
recovery hardware itself needs to be capable of error correction (e.g., 
protected using hardened flip-flops when considering soft errors). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional Techniques: Many additional resilience techniques have 
been published in literature; but, these techniques are closely related to 
our evaluated techniques. Therefore, we believe that our results are 
representative and largely cover the cross-layer design space. 
At the circuit-level, hardened flip-flops like DICE (Dual Interlocked 
storage Cell) [Calin 96], BCDMR (Bistable Cross-coupled Dual Modular 
Redundancy) [Furuta 10], and BISER (Built In Soft Error Resilience) 
[Mitra 05] are similar in cost to LEAP-DICE, the most resilient hardened 
flip-flop studied. The DICE technique suffers from an inability to tolerate 
SEMUs, unlike LEAP-DICE. BISER is capable of operating in both 
economy and resilient modes. This enhancement is provided by LEAP-
ctrl. Hardened flip-flops like RCC (Reinforcing Charge Collection) 
[Seifert 10] offer around 5× soft error rate improvement at around 1.2× 
area, power, and energy cost. LHL provides slightly more soft error 
tolerance at roughly the same cost as RCC. Circuit-level detection 
techniques such as [Blaauw 08, Fojtik 13, Nicolaidis 99] are similar to 
EDS. Like EDS, these techniques can detect soft errors while offering 
minor differences in actual implementation. Stability checking [Franco 
94] works on a similar principle of time sampling to detect errors. 
Logic-level techniques like residue codes [Ando 03] can be effective 
for specific functional units like multipliers, but are costlier to implement 
than the simple XOR-trees used in logic parity. Additional logic level 
coding techniques like Berger codes [Berger 61] and Bose-Lin codes 
[Bose 85] are costlier to implement than logic parity. Like logic parity 
checking, residue, Berger, and Bose-Lin codes only detect errors. 
Techniques like DMR (Dual Modular Redundancy) and TMR (Triple 
Modular Redundancy) at the architecture level can be easily ruled out 
since these techniques will incur more than 100% area, power, and energy 
costs. RMT (Redundant Multi-Threading) [Mukherjee 02] has been 
shown to have high (>40%) energy costs (which can increase due to 
recovery since RMT only serves to detect errors). Additionally, RMT is 
highly architecture dependent, which limits its applicability. 
Software techniques like Shoestring [Feng 10], Error detectors 
[Pattabiraman 09], Reliability-driven transforms [Rehman 14], and 
SWIFT [Reis 05a] are similar to EDDI, but offer variations to the 
technique by reducing the number of checks added. As a result, EDDI can 
be used as a bound on the maximum error detection possible. An 
enhancement to SWIFT, known as CRAFT [Reis 05b], uses HW 
acceleration to improve reliability, but doing so eliminates the benefit of 
EDDI as a software-only technique. Although it is difficult to faithfully 
compare these “selective” EDDI techniques as published (since the 
original authors evaluated improvements using high-level error injection 
at the architecture register level which are generally inaccurate), the 
published results for these “selective” EDDI techniques show insufficient 
benefit (Table 16).  Enhancements which reduce the execution time 
impact provide very low SDC improvements, while those that provide 
moderate improvement incur high execution time (and thus, energy) 
impact (much higher than providing the same improvement using LEAP-
DICE, for instance). Fault screening [Racunas 07] is an additional 
software level technique. However, this technique also checks to ensure 
intermediate values computed during execution fall within expected 
bounds, which is similar to the mechanisms behind Software assertions 
for general-purpose processors, and thus, is covered by the latter. 
 
 
 
Low-level Techniques: Resilience techniques at the circuit and logic 
layer (i.e., low-level techniques) are tunable as they can be selectively 
applied to individual flip-flops. As a result, a range of SDC/DUE 
improvements can be achieved for varying costs (Table 17). These 
techniques offer the ability to finely tune the specific flip-flops to protect 
in order to achieve the degree of resilience improvements required. 
Table 15. Hardware error recovery costs. 
Core Type Area Power Energy 
Recovery 
latency 
Unrecoverable 
flip-flop errors 
InO 
Instruction Replay 
(IR) recovery 
16% 21% 21% 47 cycles None (all pipeline 
FFs recoverable) 
EIR recovery 34% 32% 32% 47 cycles 
Flush recovery 0.6% 0.9% 1.8% 7 cycles 
FFs after memory 
write stage 
OoO 
Instruction Replay 
(IR) recovery 
0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 
104 
cycles None (all pipeline 
FFs recoverable) 
EIR recovery 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 
104 
cycles 
Reorder Buffer 
(ROB) recovery 
0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 64 cycles 
FFs after reorder 
buffer stage 
 
 
Figure 4. Instruction Replay (IR) recovery. 
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Figure 5. Flush recovery. 
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Table 16. Comparison of “selective” EDDI techniques as reported in 
literature compared to EDDI evaluated using flip-flop-level error injection. 
 
Error-
injection 
SDC 
improve 
Exec. time 
impact 
EDDI with store-readback (implemented) Flip-flop 37.8× 2.1× 
Reliability-aware transforms (published) Arch. reg. 1.8× 1.05× 
Shoestring (published) Arch. reg. 5.1× 1.15× 
SWIFT (published) Arch. reg. 13.7× 1.41× 
 
  
 
High-level Techniques: In general, techniques at the architecture, 
software, and algorithm layers (i.e., high-level techniques) are less tunable 
as there is little control of the exact subset of flip-flops a high-level 
technique will protect. From Table 3, we see that no high level technique 
provides more than 38× improvement (while most offer far less 
improvement). As a result, to achieve a 50× improvement, for example, 
augmentation from low-level techniques at the circuit- and logic-level are 
required, regardless.  
 
3. Cross-Layer Combinations 
CLEAR uses a top-down approach to explore the cost-effectiveness of 
various cross-layer combinations. For example, resilience techniques at 
the upper layers of the system stack (e.g., ABFT correction) are applied 
before incrementally moving down the stack to apply techniques from 
lower layers (e.g., an optimized combination of logic parity checking, 
circuit-level LEAP-DICE, and micro-architectural recovery). This 
approach (example shown in Fig. 6) ensures that resilience techniques 
from various layers of the stack effectively interact with one another. 
Resilience techniques from the algorithm, software, and architecture 
layers of the stack generally protect multiple flip-flops (determined using 
error injection); however, a designer typically has little control over the 
specific subset protected. Using multiple resilience techniques from these 
layers can lead to situations where a given flip-flop may be protected 
(sometimes unnecessarily) by multiple techniques. At the logic and circuit 
layers, fine-grained protection is available since these techniques can be 
applied selectively to individual flip-flops (those not sufficiently 
protected by higher-level techniques). 
We explore a total of 586 cross-layer combinations using CLEAR 
(Table 18). Not all combinations of the ten resilience techniques and four 
recovery techniques are valid (e.g., it is unnecessary to combine ABFT 
correction and ABFT detection since the techniques are mutually 
exclusive or to explore combinations of monitor cores to protect an InO-
core due to the high cost). Accurate flip-flop level injection and layout 
evaluation reveals many individual techniques provide minimal (less than 
1.5×) SDC/DUE improvement (contrary to conclusions reported in the 
literature that were derived using inaccurate architecture- or software-
level injection), have high costs, or both. The consequence of this 
revelation is that most cross-layer combinations have high cost (detailed 
results for these costly combinations are omitted for brevity but are shown 
in Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
15 Costs are generated per benchmark. We report the average cost over all 
benchmarks. Relative standard deviation is 0.6-3.1%. 
 
 
3.1 Combinations for General-Purpose Processors 
Among the 586 cross-layer combinations explored using CLEAR, a 
highly promising approach combines selective circuit-level hardening 
using LEAP-DICE, logic parity, and micro-architectural recovery (flush 
recovery for InO-cores, RoB recovery for OoO-cores). Thorough error 
injection using application benchmarks plays a critical role in selecting 
the flip-flops protected using these techniques. Figure 7 and Heuristic 1 
detail the methodology for creating this combination. If recovery is not 
needed (e.g., for unconstrained recovery), the “Harden” procedure in 
Heuristic 1 can be modified to always return false. 
For example, to achieve a 50× SDC improvement, the combination of 
LEAP-DICE, logic parity, and micro-architectural recovery provides a 
1.5× and 1.2× energy savings for the OoO- and InO-cores, respectively, 
compared to selective circuit hardening using LEAP-DICE (Table 19). 
The relative benefits are consistent across benchmarks and over the range 
of SDC/DUE improvements. The overheads in Table 19 are small because 
we reported the most energy-efficient resilience solutions. Most of the 
586 combinations are far costlier. 
Let us consider the scenario where recovery hardware is not needed 
(e.g., unconstrained recovery). In this case, a minimal (<0.2% energy) 
savings can be achieved when targeting SDC improvement. However, 
without recovery hardware, DUEs increase since detected errors are now 
uncorrectable; thus, no DUE improvement is achievable. 
Finally, one may suppose that the inclusion of EDS into cross-layer 
optimization may yield further savings since EDS costs ~25% less area, 
16 DUE improvements are not possible with detection-only techniques given 
unconstrained recovery. 
 
Figure 6. Cross-layer methodology example for combining ABFT 
correction, LEAP-DICE, logic parity, and micro-architectural recovery. 
Unprotected design Perform error injection to 
determine percentage of 
errors resulting in SDC/DUE 
per flip-flop when application 
running with ABFT correction
Protected 
design
Apply ABFT correction
Apply LEAP-DICE, parity, and recovery 
to flip-flops until required SDC/DUE 
improvement is achieved (Fig. 7)
Table 18. Creating 586 cross-layer combinations2. 
 
 No rec. 
Flush / 
RoB rec. 
IR / EIR 
rec. 
Total 
InO 
Combinations of LEAP-
DICE, EDS, parity, DFC, 
Assertions, CFCSS, EDDI 
127 3 14 144 
ABFT correction / detection 
alone 
2 0 0 2 
ABFT correction + previous 
combinations 
127 3 14 144 
ABFT detection + previous 
combinations 
127 0 0 127 
InO-core total - - - 417 
OoO 
Combinations of LEAP-
DICE, EDS, parity, DFC, 
monitor cores 
31 7 30 68 
ABFT correction / detection 
alone 
2 0 0 2 
ABFT correction + previous 
combinations 
31 7 30 68 
ABFT detection + previous 
combinations 
31 0 0 31 
OoO-core total - - - 169 
Combined Total 586 
 
Table 1715. Costs vs. SDC and DUE improvements for tunable resilience techniques. 
A (area cost %), P (power cost %), E (energy cost %)  (P=E for these combinations - no clock/execution time impact) 
 
Bounded latency recovery Unconstrained recovery16 Exec. 
time 
impact 
SDC improvement DUE improvement SDC improvement DUE improvement 
2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 
InO 
LEAP-DICE only 
A 
E 
0.8 
2 
1.8 
4.3 
2.9 
7.3 
3.3 
8.2 
9.3 
22.4 
0.7 
1.5 
1.7 
3.8 
3.8 
9.5 
5.1 
12.5 
9.3 
22.4 
0.8 
2 
1.8 
4.3 
2.9 
7.3 
3.3 
8.2 
9.3 
22.4 
0.7 
1.5 
1.7 
3.8 
3.8 
9.5 
5.1 
12.5 
9.3 
22.4 
0% 
Logic parity only 
(+ IR recovery) 
A 
E 
17.3 
23.4 
18.6 
26 
20.3 
29.4 
20.7 
30.5 
26.9 
44.1 
16.9 
22.5 
18.3 
25.4 
21.5 
31.9 
22.8 
35 
23.3 
35.9 
1.3 
2.4 
2.6 
5 
4.3 
8.4 
4.7 
9.5 
10.9 
23.1 
- - - - - 0% 
EDS-only 
(+ IR recovery) 
A 
E 
17.1 
23.1 
18.1 
25.4 
19.7 
28.5 
20.5 
29.6 
26.7 
43.9 
16.8 
22.1 
18 
25.2 
20.3 
31.5 
22.5 
39.2 
26.2 
43.7 
1.1 
2.1 
2.1 
4.4 
3.7 
7.5 
4.5 
8.6 
10.7 
22.9 
- - - - - 0% 
OoO 
LEAP-DICE only 
A 
E 
1.1 
1.5 
1.3 
1.7 
2.2 
3.1 
2.4 
3.5 
6.5 
9.4 
1.3 
2 
1.6 
2.3 
3.1 
4.2 
3.6 
5.1 
6.5 
9.4 
1.1 
1.5 
1.3 
1.7 
2.2 
3.1 
2.4 
3.5 
6.5 
9.4 
1.3 
2 
1.6 
2.3 
3.1 
4.2 
3.6 
5.1 
6.5 
9.4 
0% 
Logic parity only 
(+ IR recovery) 
A 
E 
1.9 
1.6 
2.1 
2.4 
6.1 
4.1 
6.3 
5.1 
14.2 
13.7 
1.7 
2.4 
2.6 
3 
4.5 
4.4 
5 
5.4 
13.8 
13.6 
1.8 
1.5 
2 
2.3 
5.9 
4 
6.2 
5 
14.1 
13.6 
- - - - - 0% 
EDS-only 
(+ IR recovery) 
A 
E 
1.4 
1.7 
1.8 
2.1 
3.3 
3.5 
4 
4 
12.3 
11.6 
1.3 
2.1 
2 
2.5 
3.6 
4.4 
4 
5.3 
11.8 
11.4 
1.3 
1.6 
1.7 
2 
3.2 
3.4 
3.9 
3.9 
12.2 
11.5 
- - - - - 0% 
 
  
 
power, energy than LEAP-DICE. However, a significant portion of EDS 
overhead is not captured solely by cell overhead. In fact, the additional 
cost of aggregating and routing the EDS error detection signals and the 
cost of adding delay buffers to satisfy minimum delay constraints posed 
by EDS dominates cost and prevents cross-layer combinations using EDS 
from yielding benefits (Table 19). Various additional cross-layer 
combinations spanning circuit, logic, architecture, and software layers are 
presented in Table 19. 
 
 
 
Heuristic 1: Choose LEAP-DICE or parity technique 
Input: f: flip-flop to be protected 
Output: Technique to apply to f (LEAP-DICE, parity) 
1: if HARDEN(f) then return LEAP-DICE 
2: if PARITY(f) then return parity 
3: return LEAP-DICE 
 
4: procedure HARDEN(f) 
5:     if an error in f cannot be flushed (i.e., f is in the memory,  
        exception, writeback stages of InO or after the RoB of OoO) 
6:     then return TRUE; else return FALSE 
7: end procedure 
 
8: procedure PARITY(f) 
9:     if f has timing path slack greater than delay imposed by 32-bit  
        XOR-tree (this implements low cost parity checking as  
        explained in Sec. 2.4) 
10:     then return TRUE, else return FALSE 
11: end procedure 
 
Up to this point, we have considered SDC and DUE improvements 
separately. However, it may be useful to achieve a specific improvement 
in SDC and DUE simultaneously. When targeting SDC improvement, 
DUE improvement also improves (and vice-versa); however, it is unlikely 
that the two improvements will be the same since flip-flops with high 
SDC vulnerability will not necessarily be the same flip-flops that have 
high DUE vulnerability. A simple method for targeting joint SDC/DUE 
improvement is to implement resilience until SDC (DUE) improvement 
is reached and then continue implementing resilience to unprotected flip-
flops until DUE (SDC) improvement is also achieved. This ensures that 
both SDC and DUE improvement meet (or exceed) the targeted minimum 
required improvement. Table 20 details the costs required to achieve joint 
SDC/DUE improvement using this methodology when considering a 
combination of LEAP-DICE, parity, and flush/RoB recovery. 
 
 
 
3.2 Targeting Specific Applications 
 When the application space targets specific algorithms (e.g., matrix 
operations), a cross-layer combination of LEAP-DICE, parity, ABFT 
correction, and micro-architectural error recovery (flush/RoB) provides 
 
Figure 7. Cross-layer resilience methodology for combining LEAP-DICE, 
parity, and micro-architectural recovery. 
Unprotected 
design
LEAP-DICE
Parity
Select technique using heuristic 1
Does
implemented resilience
achieve desired SDC/DUE
improvement?
yes
Protected designMark f to be protected using selected technique
no
For each flip-flop fϵS (where S is the set of all flip-flops in the 
design), determine the percentage of errors that cause SDC/DUE in f
Remove flip-flop fϵS that has highest 
percentage of errors causing SDC/DUE
(optional) include flush (InO) or RoB (OoO) recovery
Apply resilience techniques to design
Table 20. Cost to achieve joint SDC/DUE improvement with a 
combination of LEAP-DICE, parity, and flush/RoB recovery. 
Joint SDC/DUE 
improvement 
InO OoO 
Area Power Energy Area Power Energy 
2× 0.7% 2% 2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.1% 
5× 1.9% 4.2% 4.2% 0.9% 0.4% 0.4% 
50× 4.1% 9% 9% 2.8% 2.2% 2.2% 
500× 4.6% 10.8% 10.8% 3.1% 2.8% 2.8% 
max 8% 17.9% 17.9% 4.9% 7% 7% 
 
Table 19. Costs vs. SDC and DUE improvements for various combinations in general-purpose processors. 
A (area cost %), P (power cost %), E (energy cost %) 
 
Bounded latency recovery Unconstrained recovery Exec. 
time 
impact 
SDC improvement DUE improvement SDC improvement DUE improvement 
2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 
InO 
LEAP-DICE + logic parity 
(+ flush recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
0.7 
1.9 
1.9 
1.7 
3.9 
3.9 
2.5 
6.1 
6.1 
3 
6.7 
6.7 
8 
17.9 
17.9 
0.6 
1.5 
1.5 
1.5 
3.4 
3.4 
3.6 
8.4 
8.4 
4.4 
10.4 
10.4 
8 
17.9 
17.9 
0.7 
1.9 
1.9 
1.6 
3.8 
3.8 
2.4 
5.9 
5.9 
2.8 
6.5 
6.5 
7.6 
17.2 
17.2 
- - - - - 0% 
EDS + LEAP-DICE + logic 
parity (+ flush recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
0.9 
1.9 
1.9 
2.3 
4.3 
4.3 
2.7 
6.6 
6.6 
3.3 
7.2 
7.2 
8.4 
19.3 
19.3 
0.8 
1.7 
1.7 
2.1 
3.8 
3.8 
3.8 
8.5 
8.5 
4.8 
11 
11 
8.4 
19.3 
19.3 
0.9 
1.9 
1.9 
2.2 
4.2 
4.2 
2.5 
6.3 
6.3 
3.2 
7.1 
7.1 
8.1 
19 
19 
- - - - - 0% 
DFC + LEAP-DICE + logic 
parity (+ EIR recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
39.3 
32.4 
44.2 
41.1 
35.5 
56.7 
41.5 
38.7 
60.2 
43.1 
41 
62.7 
45 
50.9 
60.3 
39.3 
32.5 
45.8 
39.9 
33.9 
48.9 
41.9 
38.4 
58.3 
42.5 
40.7 
63 
45 
50.9 
60.3 
3.3 
1.4 
10.6 
5.1 
4.8 
13.9 
5.6 
8.1 
17.4 
7.1 
10 
19.9 
10.6 
18.2
25.5 
- - - - - 6.2% 
Assertions + LEAP-DICE + 
logic parity (no recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
- - - - - - - - - - 
0.7 
1.4 
17.1 
0. 
1.8 
17.5 
1 
2.2 
18 
1.1 
2.2 
18 
7.6 
17.2 
24.5 
- - - - - 15.6% 
CFCSS + LEAP-DICE + 
logic parity (no recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
- - - - - - - - - - 
0.3 
0.8 
41.5 
1 
1.8 
43 
1.4 
2.9 
44.6 
1.3 
3.1 
44.9 
7.6 
17.2 
64.8 
- - - - - 40.6% 
EDDI + LEAP-DICE + logic 
parity (no recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
- - - - - - - - - - 
0 
0 
110 
0 
0 
110 
0.7 
0.6 
111 
0.9 
0.8 
111 
7.6 
17.2 
146 
- - - - - 110% 
OoO 
LEAP-DICE + logic parity 
(+ ROB recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
0.06 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
1.4 
2.1 
2.0 
2.2 
2.4 
2.4 
4.9 
7 
7 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.7 
0.1 
0.1 
2.6 
2 
2 
3 
1.8 
1.8 
4.9 
7 
7 
0.06 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
1.4 
2.1 
2.1 
2.2 
2.4 
2.4 
4.9 
7 
7 
- - - - - 0% 
EDS + LEAP-DICE + logic 
parity (+ ROB recovery) 
A 
P
E 
0.07 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
1.6 
2.3 
2.3 
2.2 
2.5 
2.5 
5.4 
8.1 
8.1 
0.6 
0.1 
0.1 
0.8 
0.1 
0.1 
2.6 
2 
2 
3 
1.8 
1.8 
5.4 
8.1 
8.1 
0.07 
0.1 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
1.6 
2.3 
2.3 
2.2 
2.5 
2.5 
5.4 
8.1 
8.1 
- - - - - 0% 
DFC + LEAP-DICE + logic 
parity (+ EIR recovery) 
A 
P
E 
0.2 
1.1 
21.2 
1 
1.4 
21.5 
1.8 
2 
22.2 
2 
2.8 
23 
5.3 
7.2 
14.8 
0.2 
0.2 
20 
0.4 
0.2 
20.1 
1.7 
2.6 
22.9 
3.9 
3.3 
23.6 
5.3 
7.2 
14.8 
0.1 
1 
10 
0.8 
1.3 
11.4 
1.6 
1.9 
12.1 
1.8 
2.7 
12.9 
5.1 
7.1 
14.7 
- - - - - 7.1% 
Monitor core + LEAP-DICE 
+ logic parity (+ ROB rec.) 
A 
P
E 
9 
16.3 
16.3 
9 
16.3 
16.3 
9.8 
20 
20 
10.5 
20.2 
20.2 
13.9 
23.3 
23.3 
9 
16.3 
16.3 
9 
16.3 
16.3 
10.1 
20.1 
20.1 
11.2 
21.5 
21.5 
13.9 
22.3 
22.3 
9 
16.3 
16.3 
9 
16.3 
16.3 
9.8 
20 
20 
10.5 
20.2 
20.2 
13.9 
23.3 
23.3 
- - - - - 0% 
 
  
 
additional energy savings (compared to the general-purpose cross-layer 
combinations presented in Sec. 3.1. Since ABFT correction performs in-
place error correction, no separate recovery mechanism is required for 
ABFT correction. For our study, we could apply ABFT correction to three 
of our PERFECT benchmarks: 2d_convolution, debayer_filter, and 
inner_product (the rest were protected using ABFT detection). 
 The results in Table 21 confirm that combinations of ABFT correction, 
LEAP-DICE, parity, and micro-architectural recovery provide up to 1.1× 
and 2× energy savings over the previously presented combination of 
LEAP-DICE, parity, and recovery when targeting SDC improvement for 
the OoO- and InO-cores, respectively. However, as will be discussed in 
Sec. 3.2.1, the practicality of ABFT is limited when considering general-
purpose processors. 
 When targeting DUE improvement, including ABFT correction 
provides no energy savings for the OoO-core. This is because ABFT 
correction (along with most architecture and software techniques like 
DFC, CFCSS, and Assertions) performs checks at set locations in the 
program. For example, a DUE resulting from an invalid pointer access 
can cause an immediate program termination before a check is invoked. 
As a result, this DUE would not be detected by the resilience technique. 
 Although ABFT correction is useful for general-purpose processors 
limited to specific applications, the same cannot be said for ABFT 
detection (Table 21). Figure 8 shows that, since ABFT detection cannot 
perform in-place correction, ABFT detection benchmarks cannot provide 
DUE improvement (any detected error necessarily increases the number 
of DUEs). Additionally, given the lower average SDC improvement and 
generally higher execution time impact for ABFT detection algorithms, 
combinations with ABFT detection do not yield low-cost solutions. 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Additional Considerations for ABFT 
Since most applications are not amenable to ABFT correction, the flip-
flops protected by ABFT correction must also be protected by techniques 
such as LEAP-DICE or parity (or combinations thereof) for processors 
targeting general-purpose applications. This requires circuit hardening 
techniques (e.g., [Mitra 05, Zhang 06]) with the ability to selectively 
operate in an error-resilient mode (high resilience, high energy) when 
ABFT is unavailable, or in an economy mode (low resilience, low power 
mode) when ABFT is available. The LEAP-ctrl flip-flop accomplishes 
this task. The addition of LEAP-ctrl can incur an additional ~1% energy 
cost and ~3% area cost (Table 21). 
Although 44% (22% for OoO-cores) of flip-flops would need to be 
implemented using LEAP-ctrl, only 5% (2% for OoO-cores) would be 
operating in economy mode at any given time (Table 22). Unfortunately, 
this requirement of fine-grained operating mode control is difficult to 
implement in practice since it would require some firmware or software 
control to determine and pass information to a hardware controller 
indicating whether or not an ABFT application were running and which 
flip-flops to place in resilient mode and which to place in economy mode 
(rather than a simple switch setting all such flip-flops into the same 
operating mode). Therefore, cross-layer combinations using ABFT 
correction may not be practical or useful in general-purpose processors 
targeting general applications. 
 
 
 
4. Application Benchmark Dependence 
 The most cost-effective resilience techniques rely on selective circuit 
hardening / parity checking guided by error injection using application 
benchmarks. This raises the question: what happens when the applications 
in the field do not match application benchmarks? We refer to this 
situation as application benchmark dependence. 
 To quantify this dependence, we randomly selected 4 (of 11) SPEC 
benchmarks as a training set, and used the remaining 7 as a validation set. 
Resilience is implemented using the training set and the resulting design’s 
resilience is determined using the validation set. Therefore, the training 
set tells us which flip-flops to protect and the validation set allows us to 
determine what the actual improvement would be when this same set of 
flip-flops is protected. We used 50 training/validation pairs. 
 Since high-level techniques cannot be tuned to achieve a given 
resilience improvement, we analyze each as a standalone technique to 
better understand how they perform individually. For standalone 
resilience techniques, the average inaccuracy between the results of 
trained and validated resilience is generally very low (Table 23 and Table 
24) and is likely due to the fact that the improvements that the techniques 
themselves provide is already very low. We also report p-values 
[Wasserstein 16], which provide a measure of how likely the validated 
improvement and trained improvement would match. 
 
Figure 8. ABFT correction and ABFT detection benchmark comparison. 
0
1
2
0 2 4 6 8
 SDC Improvement
ABFT Correction ABFT Detection
 DUE 
Improvement
Table 22. Impact of ABFT correction on flip-flops. 
Core 
% FFs with an error corrected 
by any ABFT algorithm (∪) 
% FFs with an error corrected by 
every ABFT algorithm (∩) 
InO 44% 5% 
OoO 22% 2% 
 
Table 21. Costs vs. SDC and DUE improvement for various cross-layer combinations involving ABFT. 
A (area cost %), P (power cost %), E (energy cost %) 
 
Bounded latency recovery Unconstrained recovery Exec. 
time 
impact 
SDC improvement DUE improvement SDC improvement DUE improvement 
2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 2 5 50 500 max 
InO 
ABFT correction + 
LEAP-DICE + logic parity 
(+ flush recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
0 
0 
1.4 
0.4 
0.7 
2.2 
1.0 
1.7 
3.1 
1.2 
1.8 
3.2 
8 
17.9 
19.6 
0.3 
1 
2.4 
0.4 
1 
2.4 
1.5 
3.3 
4.8 
2.7 
5.7 
7.2 
8 
17.9 
19.6 
0 
0 
1.4 
0.4 
0.7 
2.2 
0.9 
1.6 
3 
1.1 
1.8 
3.2 
7.6 
17.2 
18.8 
- - - - - 1.4% 
ABFT detection + 
LEAP-DICE + logic parity 
(no recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
- - - - - - - - - - 
0 
0 
1.4 
1.2 
2.4 
27 
2 
4.8 
30 
2.5 
5.7 
31.1 
7.6 
17.2 
45.3 
- - - - - 24% 
ABFT correction + LEAP-ctrl + 
LEAP-DICE + logic parity 
(+ flush recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
1.5 
0.6 
1.9 
2.5 
1.3 
2.7 
3.8 
2.6 
4.0 
4.1 
2.8 
4.2 
8 
17.9 
19.6 
1 
1.3 
2.8 
1 
1.3 
2.8 
4.1 
4.6 
6.1 
5 
7 
8.5 
8 
17.9 
19.6 
1.5 
0.6 
1.9 
2.3 
1.2 
2.6 
3.4 
2.6 
4 
4 
2.7 
4.1 
7.6 
17.2 
18.8 
- - - - - 1.4% 
OoO 
ABFT correction + 
LEAP-DICE + logic parity 
(+ ROB recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
0 
0 
1.4 
0.01 
0.01 
1.5 
0.3 
0.5 
1.9 
0.5 
0.8 
2.2 
4.9 
7 
8.5 
0.4 
0.1 
1.5 
0.6 
0.1 
1.5 
2.1 
3 
4.2 
3 
1.6 
3 
4.9 
7 
8.5 
0 
0 
1.4 
0.01 
0.01 
1.5 
0.3 
0.5 
1.9 
0.5 
0.8 
2.2 
4.8 
6.9 
8.4 
- - - - - 1.4% 
ABFT detection + 
LEAP-DICE + logic parity 
(no recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
- - - - - - - - - - 
0 
0 
24 
0.1 
0.2 
24.2 
0.7 
1.2 
25.5 
1.2 
1.6 
26 
4.8 
6.9 
32.6 
- - - - - 24% 
ABFT correction + LEAP-ctrl + 
LEAP-DICE + logic parity 
(+ ROB recovery) 
A 
P 
E 
1.5 
0.3 
1.7 
1.8 
0.3 
1.7 
2.9 
1.0 
2.5 
3.2 
1.3 
2.7 
4.9 
7 
8.5 
0.6 
0.1 
1.5 
0.9 
0.1 
1.5 
2.8 
3 
4.3 
3.6 
1.6 
3.1 
4.9 
7 
8.5 
1.5 
0.3 
1.7 
1.8 
0.3 
1.7 
2.9 
1 
2.5 
3.2 
1.3 
2.7 
4.9 
6.9 
8.4 
- - - - - 1.4% 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 Table 25 and Table 26 indicate that validated SDC and DUE 
improvements are generally underestimated. Fortunately, when targeting 
<10× SDC improvement, the underestimation is minimal. This is due to 
the fact that the most vulnerable 10% of flip-flops (i.e., the flip-flops that 
result in the most SDCs or DUEs) are consistent across benchmarks. Since 
the number of errors resulting in SDC or DUE is not uniformly distributed 
among flip-flops, protecting these top 10% of flip-flops will result in the 
~10× SDC improvement regardless of the benchmark considered. The 
vulnerabilities of the remaining 90% of flip-flops are more benchmark-
dependent.  Concretely, we can analyze benchmark similarity by 
analyzing the vulnerable flip-flops indicated by each application 
benchmark. Per benchmark, one can group the most vulnerable 10% of 
flip-flops into a subset (e.g., subset 1). The next 10% of vulnerable flip-
flops (e.g., 10-20%) are grouped into subset 2 (and so on up to subset 10). 
Therefore, given our 18 benchmarks, we create 18 distinct subset 1’s, 18 
distinct subset 2’s, and so on. Each group of 18 subsets (e.g., all subset 
1’s) can then be assigned a similarity as given in Eq. 2. The similarity of 
subset “x” is the number of flip-flops that exist in all subset “x’s” (e.g., 
subset intersection) divided by the number of unique flip-flops in every 
subset “x’s” (e.g., subset union). From Table 27, it is clear that only the 
top 10% most vulnerable flip-flops have very high commonality across 
all benchmarks (the last 2 subsets have high similarity because these are 
the flip-flops that have errors that always vanish). All other flip-flops are 
relatively distributed across the spectrum depending on the specific 
benchmark being run. 
 
𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡 "𝑥") =  
| ∩ (𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑝−𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡 "𝑥") |
| ∪ (𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑝−𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑡 "𝑥") |
  (Eq. 2) 
 
 It is clear that for highly-resilient designs, one must develop methods 
to combat this sensitivity to benchmarks. Benchmark sensitivity may be 
minimized by training using additional benchmarks or through better 
benchmarks (e.g., [Mirkhani 15a]). An alternative approach is to apply 
our CLEAR framework using available benchmarks, and then replace all 
remaining unprotected flip-flops using LHL (Table 4). This enables our 
resilient designs to meet (or exceed) resilience targets at ~1% additional 
cost for SDC and DUE improvements >10×. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. The Design of New Resilience Techniques 
 CLEAR has been used to comprehensively analyze the design space of 
existing resilience techniques (and their combinations). As new resilience 
techniques are proposed, CLEAR can incorporate and analyze these 
techniques as well. However, CLEAR can also be used today to guide the 
design of new resilience techniques. 
 All resilience techniques will lie on a two-dimensional plane of energy 
cost vs. SDC improvement (Fig. 9). The range of designs formed using 
combinations of LEAP-DICE, parity, and micro-architectural recovery 
form the lowest-cost cross-layer combination available using today’s 
Table 23. Trained vs. validated SDC improvement for high-level 
techniques. Underestimation low because improvements are already low. 
Core Technique Train Validate Underestimate p-value 
InO 
DFC 1.3× 1.2× -7.7% 3.8×10-9 
Assertions 1.5× 1.4× -6.7% 2.4×10-1 
CFCSS 1.6× 1.5× -6.3% 5.7×10-1 
EDDI 37.8× 30.4× -19.6% 6.9×10-1 
ABFT correction 4.3× 3.9× -9.3% 6.7×10-1 
OoO 
DFC 1.3× 1.2× -7.7% 1.9×10-5 
Monitor core 19.6× 17.5× -5.6% 8.3×10-3 
ABFT correction 4.3× 3.7× -14% 7.2×10-1 
 
Table 24. Trained vs. validated DUE improvement for high-level 
techniques. Underestimation low because improvements are already low. 
Core Technique Train Validate Underestimate p-value 
InO 
DFC 1.4× 1.3× -7.1% 3.9×10-17 
Assertions 0.6× 0.6× 0% 8×10-2 
CFCSS 0.6× 0.6× 0% 9.2×10-1 
EDDI 0.4× 0.4× 0% 2.2×10-1 
ABFT correction 1.2× 1.2× 0% 1.8×10-1 
OoO 
DFC 1.4× 1.3× -7.1% 1.4×10-10 
Monitor core 15.2× 13.9× -8.6% 3.5×10-7 
ABFT correction 1.1× 1.1× 0% 1.5×10-1 
 
Table 25. SDC improvement, cost before and after applying LHL to 
otherwise unprotected flip-flops. 
Core 
SDC improvement 
Cost before LHL 
insertion 
Cost after LHL 
insertion 
Train Validate After LHL Area 
Power / 
Energy 
Area 
Power / 
Energy 
InO 
5× 4.8× 19.3× 1.6% 3.6% 3.1% 5.7% 
10× 9.6× 38.2× 1.7% 3.9% 3.1% 5.7% 
20× 19.1× 75.8× 1.9% 4.4% 3.2% 6.1% 
30× 26.8× 105.6× 2.2% 4.8% 3.2% 6.3% 
40× 32.9× 129.4× 2.3% 5.3% 3.3% 6.7% 
50× 38.9× 152.3× 2.4% 5.7% 3.3% 6.9% 
500× 433.1× 1,326.1× 2.9% 6.3% 3.4% 7.1% 
Max 5,568.9× 5,568.9× 8% 17.9% 8% 17.9% 
OoO 
5× 4.8× 35.1× 0.1% 0.2% 0.9% 1.8% 
10× 8.8× 40.7× 0.4% 0.6% 1.1% 2.1% 
20× 18.8× 65.6× 0.7% 1% 1.3% 2.3% 
30× 21.3× 82.3× 0.9% 1.4% 1.4% 2.4% 
40× 26.4× 130.2× 1.2% 1.7% 1.7% 2.5% 
50× 32.1× 204.3× 1.4% 2.1% 1.9% 2.7% 
500× 301.4× 1084.1× 2.2% 2.4% 2.4% 2.8% 
Max 6,625.8× 6,625.8× 4.9% 7% 4.9% 7% 
 
Table 26. DUE improvement, cost before and after applying LHL to 
otherwise unprotected flip-flops. 
Core 
DUE improvement 
Cost before LHL 
insertion 
Cost after LHL 
insertion 
Train Validate After LHL Area 
Power / 
Energy 
Area 
Power / 
Energy 
InO 
5× 4.7× 18.7× 1.5% 3.4% 3.3% 5.9% 
10× 8.7× 34.6× 1.9% 4.2% 3.5% 6.5% 
20× 16.3× 64.5× 2.4% 5.3% 3.7% 7% 
30× 23.5× 92.7× 2.8% 6.6% 3.7% 8.1% 
40× 29.9× 117.6× 3.3% 7.5% 4.1% 8.7% 
50× 35.9× 140.6× 3.6% 8.4% 4.2% 9.4% 
500× 243.5× 840.3× 4.4% 10.4% 4.8% 10.9% 
Max 5,524.7× 5,524.7× 8% 17.9% 8% 17.9% 
OoO 
5× 4.4× 28.7× 0.7% 0.1% 1.8% 1.7% 
10× 8.7× 36.6× 1.1% 0.5% 2.1% 2% 
20× 17.3× 70.2× 1.5% 0.9% 2.5% 2% 
30× 22.2× 81.5× 1.8% 1.3% 2.6% 2.1% 
40× 26.1× 115.1× 2.1% 1.6% 2.8% 2.4% 
50× 29.8× 121.3× 2.5% 2% 3.1% 2.6% 
500× 153.2× 625.1× 2.9% 1.9% 3.4% 2.7% 
Max 6,802.6× 6,802.6× 4.9% 7% 4.9% 7% 
 
Table 27. Subset similarity across all 18 benchmarks for the InO-core 
(subsets broken into groups consisting of 10% of all flip-flops). 
Subset 
(ranked by decreasing SDC + DUE vulnerability) 
Similarity (Eq. 2) 
1: 0-10% 0.83 
2: 10-20% 0.05 
3: 20-30% 0 
4: 30-40% 0 
5: 40-50% 0 
6: 50-60% 0 
7: 60-70% 0 
8; 70-80% 0 
9: 80-90% 0.71 
10: 90-100% 1 
 
  
 
resilience techniques. In order for new resilience techniques to be able to 
create competitive cross-layer combinations, they must have energy and 
improvement tradeoffs that place the technique under the region bounded 
by our LEAP-DICE, parity, and micro-architectural recovery solution. 
Since certain standalone techniques, like LEAP-DICE, can also provide 
highly competitive solutions, it is useful to understand the cost vs. 
improvement tradeoffs for new techniques in relation to this best 
standalone technique as well (Fig. 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 CLEAR is a first of its kind cross-layer resilience framework that 
enables effective exploration of a wide variety of resilience techniques 
and their combinations across several layers of the system stack. 
Extensive cross-layer resilience studies using CLEAR demonstrate: 
1. A carefully optimized combination of selective circuit-level 
hardening, logic-level parity checking, and micro-architectural recovery 
provides a highly cost-effective soft error resilience solution for general-
purpose processors. 
2. Selective circuit-level hardening alone, guided by thorough analysis 
of the effects of soft errors on application benchmarks, also provides a 
cost-effective soft error resilience solution (with ~1% additional energy 
cost for a 50× SDC improvement compared to the above approach). 
3. Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) correction combined with 
selective circuit-level hardening (and logic-level parity checking and 
micro-architectural recovery) can further improve soft error resilience 
costs. However, existing ABFT correction techniques can only be used 
for a few applications; this limits the applicability of this approach in the 
context of general-purpose processors. 
4. Based on our analysis, we can derive bounds on energy costs vs. 
degree of resilience (SDC or DUE improvements) that new soft error 
resilience techniques must achieve to be competitive. 
5. It is crucial that the benefits and costs of new resilience techniques 
are evaluated thoroughly and correctly before publication. Detailed 
analysis (e.g., flip-flop-level error injection or layout-level cost 
quantification) identifies hidden weaknesses that are often overlooked. 
 While this paper focuses on soft errors in processor cores, cross-layer 
resilience solutions for accelerators and uncore components as well as 
other error sources (e.g., voltage noise) may have different tradeoffs and 
may require additional modeling and analysis capabilities. 
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Appendix A. Flip-flops with Errors That Always Vanish 
 Flip-flops in 50 structures of the InO-core and 142 structures of the 
OoO-core have errors that always vanish. 
 InO-core: a.ctrl.inst, a.ctrl.tt, a.ctrl.wy, a.cwp, 
a.rfe1, a.rfe2, d.pv, e.ctrl.inst, e.ctrl.tt, 
e.ctrl.wy, e.cwp, e.et, e.mac, e.mul, e.mulstep, e.su, 
e.ymsb, m.ctrl.inst, m.ctrl.pc, m.ctrl.tt, m.ctrl.wicc, 
m.ctrl.wy, m.dci.asi, m.dci.lock, m.dci.signed, 
m.irqen, m.irqen2, m.y, w.s.dwt, w.s.ec, w.s.ef, 
w.s.icc, w.s.pil, w.s.ps, w.s.tba, w.s.tt, w.s.y, 
x.ctrl.inst, x.ctrl.pc, x.ctrl.pv, x.ctrl.rett, 
x.ctrl.tt, x.ctrl.wicc, x.ctrl.wy, x.debug, x.icc, 
x.intack, x.ipend, x.npc, x.y 
 OoO-core: D0R0.reg0, D0R0.reg1, D0R0.reg2, D0R0.reg3, 
exec.ca0.br, exec.ca0.p0, exec.ca0.p1, exec.ca0.p2, 
exec.cb0.buffer.valid.reg, exec.cb0.queue.head.reg, 
exec.cb0.queue.tail.reg, exec.mu0.a01, exec.mu0.a12, 
exec.mu0.a23, exec.mu0.a34, exec.mu0.b01, exec.mu0.b12, 
exec.mu0.b23, exec.mu0.b34, exec.mu0.i0, exec.mu0.i1, 
exec.mu0.i2, exec.mu0.i3, F0.flushPC.reg, F1.reg0, 
F1.reg2, F1.reg3, F1.reg6, mem.finished.st2.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.accessaddr0.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.accessaddr1.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.accessaddrtype0.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.accessaddrtype1.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.accessfulldata0.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.accessfulldata1.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.accesshit0.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.addr.in0.reg, mem.l1dcache.addr.in1.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.addr.in2.reg, mem.l1dcache.addr.in3.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.addr.in5.reg, mem.l1dcache.addr.in7.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.addr1.out.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.addr2.out.reg, mem.l1dcache.data.in0.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.data.in1.reg, mem.l1dcache.data.in2.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.data.in3.reg, mem.l1dcache.data.in4.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.data.in5.reg, mem.l1dcache.data.in6.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.data.in7.reg, mem.l1dcache.data2.out.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.missqueue.delayed.returnedaddr1.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.missqueue.delayed.returnedaddr2.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.missqueue.delayed.returnedhit1.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.missqueue.delayed.returnedhit2.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.missqueue.q.done.f.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.missqueue.q.type.f.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.mobid2.out.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.size1.out.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.size2.out.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.write.in0.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.write.in1.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.write.in2.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.write.in3.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.write.in4.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.write.in5.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.write.in6.reg, 
mem.l1dcache.write.in7.reg, 
mem.ldq.address.phys.f.reg, mem.ldq.forward.f.reg, 
mem.ldq.num.entries.f.reg, 
mem.returned.hintvalid1.delayed.reg, 
mem.stb.forward.data1.delayed.reg, 
mem.stb.forward.data2.delayed.reg, 
mem.stb.forward.stid1.delayed.reg, 
mem.stb.forward.stid2.delayed.reg, 
mem.stq.address.v.f.reg, regs.ex.wb.agen1, 
regs.ex.wb.cond0, regs.ex.wb.d0, regs.ex.wb.data, 
regs.ex.wb.i0, regs.ex.wb.i1, regs.ex.wb.i2, 
regs.ex.wb.i3, regs.ex.wb.i4, regs.ex.wb.i5, 
regs.rr.ex.cond, regs.rr.ex.data, regs.rr.ex.i0, 
regs.rr.ex.i1, regs.rr.ex.i2, regs.rr.ex.i3, 
regs.rr.ex.i4, regs.rr.ex.i5, regs.rr.ex.valid, 
regs.wb.wb.brdir, regs.wb.wb.flushpc, regs.wb.wb.ret1, 
regs.wb.wb.ret2, regs.wb.wb.ret3, regs.wb.wb.ret4, 
regs.wb.wb.ret5, regs.wb.wb.ret6, regs.wb.wb.ret7, 
regs.wb.wb.ret8, regsIRR.reg0, regsIRR.reg1, 
regsIRR.reg2, regsIRR.reg3, regsIRR.reg4, regsIRR.reg5, 
regsR0R1.reg0, regsR0R1.reg1, regsR0R1.reg2, 
regsR0R1.reg3, regsR1I.reg0, regsR1I.reg1, 
regsR1I.reg2, regsR1I.reg3, RF0.F1.lhist, 
RF0.F1.ras.ret.inv, RF0.F1.takenAddress, RF0.PCreg, 
RF1.F2.inst0, RF1.F2.inst1, RF1.F2.inst2, RF1.F2.inst3, 
RF1.F2.inst4, RF1.F2.inst5, RF1.F2.inst6, RF1.F2.inst7, 
RF2.D0.reg0, RF2.D0.reg1, RF2.D0.reg2, RF2.D0.reg3, 
rob.rob.dir.f.reg, sched0.inst.array.reg, 
sched0.sb0.sb.activate.reg, sched0.sb0.sb.counters.reg 
 
 
